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THE NEWSMAN'S CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PRIVILEGE
IN VIRGINIA
Phillip Randolph Roach, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The two hundredth anniversary celebration of the United States
Constitution in 1987 provided an excellent opportunity to reflect
upon how we now interpret the political doctrines that influenced
the founding fathers in forming our government. At the time of the
American Revolution, the basic tenets and freedoms that were
written into the Declaration of Independence, and later incorpo-
rated into the Bill of Rights through the efforts of James Madison
and George Mason of Virginia were considered essential human
rights.1
One of these basic tenets, contributing to the creation and
growth of our nation, is the freedom of the American press. Even
before Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence,
George Mason, in his Virginia Declaration of Rights, stated: "[T]he
freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty and can
never be restrained but by despotic governments."2 Jefferson later
relied upon Mason's Declaration of Rights in drafting the Declara-
tion of Independence.3 Mason's work was also incorporated into
the United States Constitution in 1791 as the Bill of Rights4 and
into numerous state constitutions as well.5
* Staff Attorney, Court of Appeals of Virginia; B.A., 1982, University of Virginia; J.D.,
1985, T.C. Williams School of Law.
1. DIVISION OF HUMANITIES AND SECONDARY ADMINISTRATION, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE: VIRGINIA 1763-1783 (n.d.) [hereinafter THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE]; M. SAVELLE & D. WAX, A HISTORY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 780-81 (3d ed.
1973).
2. THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 46-47.
3. Id. Jefferson stated: "A bill of rights ... is what the people are entitled to against
every government on earth, general or particular, and what no government should refuse, or
rest on inference." M. SAVELLE & D. wAx, supra note 1, at 781.
4. U. S. CONST. amend. I states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press."
5. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 12 which provides:
That the freedoms of speech and of the press are among the great bulwarks of liberty,
and can never be restrained except by despotic governments; that any citizen may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
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A frequently overlooked and relatively recent manifestation of
this freedom is the growing belief among journalists that they have
a right to withhold the identity of confidential sources of informa-
tion. Many journalists have gone to jail rather than yield to a court
order requiring them to reveal the identity of a confidential in-
formant.' In fact, the public's recognition of this pledge provides a
wealth of news tips to newspapers and television stations across
the country. Moreover, journalists are convinced that if the free
flow of information diminishes as a result of court-ordered disclo-
sure of their sources' identities, they will be reduced to printing
public relations handouts and press releases.7 Reporters such as
Jack Anderson and Clark R. Mollenhoff contend that their articles
exposing government corruption would have been impossible with-
out their reliance on confidential informants.8
However, there are practical needs for disclosure that a news-
man's confidential source privilege would substantially frustrate,'
including the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the
defendant's right to compel testimony in his own behalf.10 Yet the
United States Supreme Court has recently declined to decide a
number of cases on appeal which have presented some of these im-
portant issues."
This article will examine the competing interests in recognizing a
newsman's confidential source privilege and discuss the justifica-
tions used to protect as well as reveal the identity of a newsman's
the abuse of that right; that the General Assembly shall not pass any law abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press.
6. H. SIMONS & J. CALIFANO, THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 12 (1976).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 12-13.
9. See generally Dixon, The Constitution is Shield Enough for Newsmen, 60 A.BA J.
707, 708 (1974); Lewis, First Amendment Hubris, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1981, § 4, at 15, col.
1 (discussing the need for disclosure to prevent reporters, particularly one from The Wash-
ington Post who lied about a child drug addict, from winning Pulitzer Prizes for fabricated
stories). But see N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1981, § 4, at 22, col. 4 (editorial supporting the need
to protect the identity of a reporter's confidential sources).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . [and] to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... "
11. See, e.g., LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 79 (1986); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1981); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); see also Cullen, Circumventing Branzburg: Absolute Pro-
tection for Confidential News Sources, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 615, 637 (1984).
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confidential sources. It will also analyze how the legislatures and
the courts have attempted to deal with these competing interests,
both on the federal and state levels. Finally, this article will con-
sider the present status of this privilege in Virginia.
II. HISTORY OF THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE
Proponents of a confidential source privilege for journalists have
attempted to justify its existence in numerous ways. 2 First, they
have tried to establish the basis for the privilege in the legislatures,
by supporting the adoption of state or federal shield laws, creating
a privilege similar to an attorney-client, 13 physician-patient, 4 or
priest-penitent privilege.' 5 Secondly, these proponents have turned
to the courts to establish this privilege based upon a common law
or first amendment rationale. 6 Reporters have also refused to
identify a confidential source based on the fifth amendment. 7
However, each approach has met with varying degrees of success.
12. See generally, Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Privilege to Conceal Confi-
dential News Sources, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 129 n.4 (1971).
13. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1986); see also W.
BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 212-13 (1983); Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 559 (1985).
14. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 1984). However, in Virginia, the phy-
sician-patient privilege is qualified and no such privilege exists in a criminal prosecution.
See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d 845 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 994
(1976).
15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
16. Comment, Developments in the News Media Privilege: The Qualified Approach Be-
coming Common Law, 33 ME. L. REV. 401 (1981).
17. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional
Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301 (1979).
However, the courts have been reluctant to accept the fifth amendment rationale as a basis
for a privilege. See Comment, supra note 12, at 129. It is not so much a journalistic privi-
lege, but one of a citizen, and it has, therefore, fallen into disfavor as a defense. Comment,
The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in
Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301 (1979).
In Virginia, if the reporter is not the defendant in a criminal case, he may be called to
testify and cannot avoid taking the stand by asserting his fifth amendment privilege. Wor-
rells v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 270, 183 S.E.2d 723 (1971). He must take the stand and
assert the privilege to each question which calls for an incriminating response. See R. BAC-
GAL, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 7-11 to 7-12 (1983). The witness must demonstrate
to the trial court "(1) ... how conceivably a prosecutor, building on the seemingly harmless
answer, might proceed step by step to link the witness with some crime ... and (2) that
this suggested course and scheme of linkage not seem incredible in the circumstances of the
particular case." North American Mortgage Investors v. Pomponio, 219 Va. 914, 919, 252
S.E.2d 345, 348-49 (1979) (quoting United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir.
1952)). Whether the witness can validly assert the privilege is a matter for the trial court's
determination. Id. at 918, 252 S.E.2d at 348 (citing Heligman v. United States, 407 F.2d 448,
450-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969)). See generally BACIGAL, supra at §§ 7-11
to 7-15.
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A. Common Law Argument
The earliest reported case in which a newsman refused to reveal
the identity of his confidential source was Ex Parte Nugent,"" de-
cided in 1848. Since that time, reporters have tried to persuade the
courts to adopt a common-law newsman's privilege.19 However, the
state courts have never been receptive to this argument and, in
fact, no state without a statutorily created protection has ever rec-
ognized a newsman's confidential source privilege at common law.20
On the other hand, recent decisions in the federal courts indicate a
growing acceptance of a federal common-law privilege. The adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 seemed to provide an
opening for the creation of a journalist's privilege, at least to the
extent that Rule 501 allows federal courts to apply privileges gov-
erned by the principles of common law as interpreted "in light of
reason and experience."' 21 Relying on Rule 501, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, in Riley v. City of Chester,22 stated:
"The strong public policy which supports the unfettered communi-
cation to the public of information, comment and opinion and the
Constitutional dimension of that policy . . . leads us to conclude
that journalists have a federal common law privilege, albeit quali-
fied, to refuse to divulge their sources. '23 This federal common-law
18. 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375) (opinion does not indicate whether the
reporter made a specific claim for a newsman's privilege).
19. See Comment, supra note 17, at 302 (a history of major cases illustrating failed at-
tempts to establish a common-law privilege for newsmen).
20. See Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert. dismissed, 402
U.S. 901 (1971); see also Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of Con-
fidential Sources of Information, 99 A.L.R.3D 37 (1980) (jurisdictions refusing to recognize a
newsman's privilege at common law in absence of an applicable statute).
21. FED. R. EVID. 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
22. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
23. Id. at 715; see also Note, Evidentiary Privilege: The Development of Federal Com-
mon Law Press Privilege-Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979), 6 U. DAYroN
L. REv. 251 (1981).
380 [Vol. 22:377
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privilege was reaffirmed in United States v. Cuthbertson,24 in
which the court extended the privilege to criminal cases.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, and any common-law privilege
derived from them, apply only in federal question cases25 since
Rule 501 requires federal courts to apply state privilege law in di-
versity cases.28 In addition, the newsman's reliance on common-law
principles as the source of a confidential source privilege has fallen
into disfavor since the decision of Garland v. Torre2 7 in 1958. Jour-
nalists now rely more on first amendment arguments28 and state
shield laws.29
B. First Amendment Argument
Since journalists have been rather unsuccessful in arguing a
newsman's confidential source privilege exists through the common
law, they have turned to the first amendment as a basis for with-
holding confidential information." The first case to test this argu-
ment was Garland v. Torre,31 in which Judy Garland deposed
Marie Torre, a columnist whose article, published in the New York
Herald Tribune on January 10, 1957, contained statements alleged
to be false, defamatory, and highly damaging to Garland's profes-
sional reputation. Torre refused to name the sources used for the
statements printed in her article and the district court held her in
contempt.32 Justice Potter Stewart, speaking for the majority of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, partially agreed with
Torre's first amendent argument that disclosure of confidential in-
formation might "entail an abridgment of press freedom by impos-
ing some limitation upon the availability of news."'3  However,
24. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
25. See Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Comment, supra
note 16, at 404-06.
26. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Comment, supra note 16, at 405.
27. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); see infra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 4. For a good discussion of the historical background of the first
amendment as a basis for a newsman's privilege, see Comment, The Newsperson's Privilege
and the Right to Compulsory Process-Establishing an Equilibrium, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
694 (1980).
31. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
32. Id. at 547.
33. Id. at 548 (footnote of court omitted).
1988]
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since the requested information "went to the heart of the plain-
tiff's claim," the court held that the Constitution provided no pro-
tection.3 4 In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan,35 which limited the ability of public officials to
obtain relief in a libel action, seems to lend support to the limited
first amendment privilege recognized in Garland.38
The most often cited case concerning a first amendment basis
for a newsman's privilege is Branzburg v. Hayes.37 In Branzburg,
the Supreme Court stated: "The issue in these cases is whether
requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal
grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed
by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not."38 Yet the ma-
jority also said that it was not suggesting "that news gathering
does not qualify for First Amendment protection" 39 because its de-
cision was limited to the grand jury context.40 Moreover, the
Court's holding applies only when the grand jury proceeding is in-
stituted in good faith and not for purposes of official harassment.4'
As a result, the majority of state and federal courts considering
similar issues since Branzburg have limited the Supreme Court's
holding to grand jury contexts and have recognized a qualified first
amendment-based newsman's privilege in other areas.4" The extent
34. Id. at 550.
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN. L. REv. 435, 436
(1980); Comment, supra note 16, at 406-07.
37. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (a consolidation of three separate cases, each of which concerned
whether a reporter could be required to disclose the source of confidential information in a
grand jury context). Space limitations in this article prevent a detailed analysis of the
Branzburg decision. However, there are a number of articles that review this case and its
impact on subsequent decisions. See, e.g., S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISH-
ERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS § 3.01-.05 (1982); Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 36;
Comment, supra note 16; Comment, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg: The Case
for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160 (1976) [hereinafter Federal Shield Law];
Note, The Rights of Sources-The Critical Element in the Clash over Reporter's Privilege,
88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979).
38. 408 U.S. at 667.
39. Id. at 681.
40. "The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the
commission of crime." Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 707-08.
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419
U.S. 966 (1974); see also Goodale, Putan & Smeall, Review of Privilege Cases, 2 NINTH




of protection afforded to newsmen43  is uncertain because
Branzburg failed to establish a guiding constitutional principle to
distinguish privileged from nonprivileged communications.
C. Shield Law Argument
Many state legislatures have passed statutes, known as shield
laws, which specifically afford newsmen a privilege that prevents
forced disclosure of any information they received in confidence."
The purpose of these laws is to encourage the free flow of informa-
tion between informants and the press, especially when the inform-
ant will only divulge such information if assured that his name will
not be released to the public.45 The Supreme Court has stated that
both Congress and the state legislatures are free to enact shield
laws for newsmen at their discretion. 46 However, almost one-half of
the states have never taken advantage of this opportunity nor has
Congress passed a comprehensive federal shield law.47 Of course,
the legislatures that have passed shield laws have encountered dif-
ficulties in determining whether the privilege should be absolute or
qualified and who should be considered a "newsman" for purposes
of the statute.48 In addition, the courts may restrict the scope and
effectiveness of the laws through their interpretations of the stat-
utes on a case-by-case basis.49
43. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 760 (1977).
44. For a more detailed analysis of state and federal legislative efforts to deal with the
newsman's privilege, see infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
45. See Note, Shield Statutes: A Changing Problem in Light of Branzburg, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 1381, 1395 (1979).
46. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory news-
man's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as nar-
row or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned. . . . There is also
merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion
their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the rela-
tions between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas.
Id.
47. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
49. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 303 (stating that "the biggest single constraint upon the benefit of
legislatively enacted press shields . . . [may be] the restrictive interpretations placed upon
them by state courts").
1988]
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III. NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE IN VIRGINIA
Newsmen in Virginia recognize the importance of confidential
informants. The code of ethics adopted by the Society of Profes-
sional Journalists in 1975 at its national convention states that
journalists "acknowledge the newsman's ethic of protecting confi-
dential sources of information. ' 50 However, the journalists' recog-
nition of the privilege is not decisive. The existence of a privilege
in Virginia is determined by the court-not by the witness-with
the party claiming the privilege having the burden of proving that
he is entitled to its protection. 51
A. Virginia's Limited Basis for a Newsman's Privilege
Except for the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, there is a general lack of authority in Virginia concerning the
confidential source privilege. Article I, section 12 of the Virginia
Constitution does prohibit the restraint of freedom of speech and
of the press,52 but the courts have never relied upon this section in
deciding whether a newsman's privilege exists in Virginia. In addi-
tion, Rule 4:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia allows
discovery of materials that are "not privileged, 5 3 but communica-
tions to a journalist have never been clearly recognized in Virginia
as being privileged. Moreover, there is no shield law in Virginia
that prevents forced disclosure of a newsman's confidential infor-
mation. Nor are there guidelines from the Virginia Attorney Gen-
50. CODE OF ETHICS (Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi 1973), re-
printed in VIRGINIA STATE BAR, NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA LAW AND COURTS 8-12,
8-13 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK]. But see CIein v. State, 52 So. 2d
117, 120 (Fla. 1950), ("Though there is a canon of journalistic ethics forbidding the disclo-
sure of a newspaper's source of information, . . . it must yield when in conflict with the
interests of justice,-the private interest involved must yield to the interests of the public").
51. See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943) (discussing the
attorney-client privilege); C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 63 (1983).
52. See supra note 5.
53. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1986) states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
[Vol. 22:377
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era 54 as there are on the federal level concerning the issuance of
subpoenas against reporters and search warrants against their of-
fices.55 Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia has rejected this
privilege as being part of Virginia's common law.5
B. Supreme Court of Virginia on a Newsman's Privilege
Brown v. Commonwealth57 is the only case decided by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia dealing with a newsman's privilege. In
Brown, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder.58 On
the day after the killing, Helaine Patterson, of the Free Lance
Star, reported that the victim was shot in the head while walking
through a junkyard with a companion after they apparently sur-
prised two unknown men already on the property. Patterson fur-
ther reported that the information came from "a spokesman in the
Stafford County Sheriff's Department. 5 9 The investigating officer
testified that he talked to a female reporter from the Free Lance
Star the morning after the shooting, but he denied making any of
the statements attributed to the spokesman. 0
After unsuccessfully attempting to learn the identity of the con-
fidential source by filing a motion for discovery and inspection and
subpoenaing "John Doe and Richard Roe, Spokesmen for Stafford
County Sheriff's Department," the defendant subpoenaed the au-
thor of the article. Patterson refused to reveal the identity of her
54. VA- CODE ANN. § 2.1-118 (Repl. Vol. 1987) states:
The Attorney General shall give his advice and render official advisory opinions in
writing only when requested in writing to do so by one of the following: the Governor;
a member of the General Assembly; a judge of a court of record or a judge of a court
not of record; the State Corporation Commission; an attorney for the Commonwealth;
a county attorney in those counties in which such office has been created; a clerk of a
court of record; a city or county sheriff; a city or county treasurer or similar officer; a
commissioner of the revenue or similar officer; a chairman or secretary of an electoral
board; the head of a state department, division, bureau, institution or board.
In any event, even if the Attorney General issued an advisory opinion on the subject, which
seems unlikely, it would not be binding on the courts or the General Assembly. See Forest
Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 540 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Va. 1982), affd in
part, vacated in part and remanded, 728 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984).
55. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976) (U.S. Attorney General guidelines concerning issuance
of subpoenas to newsmen); see infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
56. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 966 (1974).
57. 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). (Brown
involved a reporter who was subpoenaed to testify in a criminal trial).
58. Id. at 756, 204 S.E.2d at 430.
59. Id. at 755, 204 S.E.2d at 430.
60. Id. at 756, 204 S.E.2d at 430.
3851988]
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source, asserting a first amendment privilege. The trial court, bal-
ancing "freedom of the press and the right of the defendant to
compel disclosure," did not require Patterson to reveal her
source.
61
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized that a
newsman's privilege is "an important catalyst to the free flow of
information guaranteed by the freedom of the press clause of the
First Amendment," and is a "privilege related to the first amend-
ment and not a first amendment right, absolute, universal, and
paramount to all other rights. '62 The court continued, saying that
the privilege of confidentiality should yield "only when the defend-
ant's need is essential to a fair trial," and that must be determined
from the facts and circumstances in each case.63 The court con-
cluded that:
When there are reasonable grounds to believe that information in
the possession of a newsman is material to proof of any element of a
criminal offense, or to proof of the defense asserted by the defend-
ant, or to a reduction in the classification or gradation of the offense
charged, or to a mitigation of the penalty attached, the defendant's
need to acquire such information is essential to a fair trial; when
such information is not otherwise available, the defendant has a due
process right to compel disclosure of such information and the iden-
tity of the source; and any privilege of confidentiality claimed by the
newsman, must, upon pain of contempt, yield to that right."4
In Brown, the defendant was trying to impeach the credibility of
a prosecution witness by proving that the witness had made prior
inconsistent statements. However, the court held that when the
right to impeach the testimony of a witness collides with the news-
man's privilege of confidentiality, the privilege will prevail unless
the inconsistent statements are material to the case, as defined
above.65
The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a balancing test similar
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972)).
63. Id. at 757, 204 S.E.2d at 431.
64. Id. (citing State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974)) (emphasis in original).
See also VA. CONsT. art. I, § 8, stating: "That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to
demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and
witnesses, and to call for evidence in his favor ... .
65. 214 Va. at 758, 204 S.E.2d at 431.
[Vol. 22:377
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to that proposed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
Branzburg6 6 Thus, a party in Virginia seeking a reporter's confi-
dential information must demonstrate that: (1) the information is
reasonably believed to be material to the case; (2) it is otherwise
unavailable; and (3) it is essential to the conduct of the trial.
This case serves as the only basis for the existence of a qualified
newsman's privilege in Virginia. It is important to note that this
decision involved a third-party subpoena in a criminal case and ar-
guably, there remains an open question as to how the court would
consider a journalist's privilege in a civil context, or if the journal-
ist were an actual party in the case. Also the Supreme Court of
Virginia has never ruled on the legality of obtaining a search war-
rant to search a newspaper's office for evidence, rather than using a
subpoena to obtain this information.
67
IV. OPEN QUESTIONS IN VIRGINIA: How OTHER JURISDICTIONS
HAVE DEALT WITH A NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE
A. Shield Laws
1. State Efforts
When journalists were unsuccessful in getting the courts to rec-
ognize a common-law newsman's privilege, they turned to the leg-
islatures for enactment of state shield laws. The first shield law
was enacted by the Maryland legislature in 1896.68 New Jersey, the
next state to follow suit, waited thirty-seven years before taking
similar action.69 There are presently twenty-six states with shield
laws that protect the identity of newsmen's confidential sources
and their information, each with varying degrees of protection. 0
66. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
67. But see infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
68. See Comment, supra note 17, at 302. The statute is reported to have been prompted
by the jailing of Baltimore Sun reporter John T. Morris for 17 days in December 1886 and
January 1887 for refusing to reveal the identity of his source for an article. Id. n.40.
69. Id. at 302.
70. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (Repl. Vol. 1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150 -.160 (1983);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARm. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, pp. 8-901 to -909 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Repl. Vol.
1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. RE V. STAT. ANN. §§
45:1451-:1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (CuM. Supp. 1987);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a. (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025
(West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1986); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144
to -147 (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to
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By the time the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Branzburg, nineteen states had passed some form of shield law7 1
and twelve of those offered an absolute privilege to newsmen.7 2 Af-
ter the Court in Branzburg encouraged states to pass their own
shield laws, seven more states enacted them, and several of the
others substantially strengthened already existing ones.
73
However, Virginia has not yet passed a newsman's shield law. If
a reporter refuses to reveal his confidential source, and no compro-
mise is reached, the reporter must choose between testifying or
facing a contempt citation for refusing to disclose his source. 4
Even if Virginia enacts a shield law, the General Assembly will
undoubtedly face many of the same problems that other legisla-
tures have encountered. 5 Some of the difficult decisions it must
make include: (1) who will be covered by the statute,76 (2) what
information the journalist will be allowed to keep confidential and
what must be disclosed,7 7 and (3) how far the privilege should ex-
-21.1 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. R. EVID. 11-514; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04-
.12 (Baldwin 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 44.510-
.540 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to -3
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (Repl. Vol. 1980); see also Goodale, Putan & Smeall,
supra note 42, at 483-500 (listing of state statutes and major cases interpreting them).
71. NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 5-4; Comment, supra note 17, at 303.
72. NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 5-4.
73. Comment, supra note 17, at 303.
74. NEws MEDIA HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 5-5. This source also reports that, since
this practice has been adopted in Virginia, it has worked well enough so that neither the
media nor the bar has lobbied the General Assembly for passage of a shield law.
75. See generally NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 5-4; Dixon, supra note 9, at
710.
76. The term "press" traditionally covers the written media of newspapers and
magazines and is also thought to encompass radio, television, and the wire services. See
Note, supra note 45, at 1392. Some state shield laws recognize all categories of the press.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns RepI.
Vol. 1986). However, some statutes only afford a privilege to "reporters"--a rather vague
term that is often difficult for the courts to apply. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-
4326 (1974). In addition, if the statute covers "professional journalists," see, e.g., N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988), it tends to favor only the legitimate
media at the expense of limited periodicals, newsletters, and freelance contributors. See
Note, supra note 45, at 1393.
77. See Note, supra note 45, at 1394-95 (discussing whether the statute should protect
the information given to the reporter as well as the identity of the informant); FRIEND,
supra note 51, § 63 (discussing whether the privilege should cover written as well as oral
communications); United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (addressing
whether a journalist should be allowed a privilege as to what he sees as well as what he is
told).
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tend.78 Then the journalists must hope the courts will not severely
limit the privilege through judicial interpretation of the statute.7
2. Federal Efforts
Because of great differences among state shield laws, many jour-
nalists have turned to Congress seeking enactment of a federal
shield law that would create a uniform privilege for newsmen. It
has been argued that such a federal statute could be made binding
on the states through Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerces 0 or by the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 "
The first proposal for a federal shield law was introduced in 1929
by Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas. Since that time, almost every
other session of Congress has received a similar bill.82 In fact,
ninety-nine proposals were introduced in either the House or the
Senate between 1973 and 1978. Of these ninety-nine, sixty-five
were introduced in the first session of the Ninety-third Con-
gress-the first session to meet after the Branzburg decision.8 3
However, none of the proposals have ever passed.
That a federal law has never been enacted in this area is attribu-
table to the voluntary guidelines promulgated by the United States
Attorney General and the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, both of
which regulate the issuance of subpoenas to reporters by federal
officers. 4 In addition, Congress suffers from the same problems
that have plagued the state legislatures in trying to pass a shield
law.8
5
78. In considering how far the privilege should extend, one should note that a newsman's
absolute privilege could be inconsistent with the public's interest in criminal investigations.
Dixon, supra note 9, at 710.
79. See supra note 49.
80. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, states, in part: "The Congress shall have power . .. [t]o
regulate commerce ... among the several States." Congress has used its authority under
the interstate commerce clause to regulate the press. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); see also infra note
111 and accompanying text.
81. U. S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. See also Federal Shield Law, supra note 37, at 188.
82. NEWS MEDIA HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 5-4.
83. Comment, supra note 17, at 310 n.49.
84. See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
85.- See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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B. Discovery of Confidential Information: Search Warrants or
Subpoenas
1. The Growing Use of Subpoenas
In the late 1960's during the Nixon administration, there was a
marked increase in subpoenas issued against reporters.8 6 This in-
crease was largely concentrated in areas generally associated with
"radical activities, 8 7 such as Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and
San Francisco. As an illustration, in the first year after Branzburg,
the Los Angeles Times, which was seen as a source of both cheap
and expert witnesses,8 spent $200,000 in legal fees just resisting
subpoenas."
In an attempt to calm the mounting tensions with the media, in
1970, Attorney General Mitchell issued federal guidelines for issu-
ing subpoenas to newsmen. These guidelines were later codified as
regulations in 1973 under Attorney General Richardson. The
guidelines were praised by the United States Supreme Court in
Branzburg as a means of controlling the potential abuse of
subpoenas."'
However, the regulations govern only Justice Department per-
sonnel. They are not binding on state or local officials or private
parties.92 Moreover, the regulations, at times, have not been
strictly followed; between August, 1970, and October, 1972, five of
the eleven subpoenas requested under the guidelines were never
authorized by the Attorney General. 3
86. See 119 CONG. REC. 38,576 (1973) (statement of Sen. Ervin noting the need for a
subcommittee study of the recent increase in subpoenas issued under the Nixon administra-
tion); see also Federal Shield Law, supra note 37, at 162-63.
87. Federal Shield Law, supra note 37, at 163.
88. SIMONS & CALIFANO, supra note 6, at 14.
89. Id.
90. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976). The pertinent parts of the regulation state that the Justice
Department should first enter into negotiations with the media if a request for a subpoena is
contemplated. Id. § 50.10(c), (d), (e). A subpoena requires the approval of the Attorney
General and will only be issued if: (1) the information sought is essential to a successful
investigation, (2) the information is otherwise unobtainable, and (3) the subpoena will be
limited in scope to avoid claims of harassment. Id. § 50.10(f).
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706-07 (1972); see also 119 CONG. REc. 38,587
(1973) (statement of Sen. Ervin commending the regulations as an "effort to restore the
balance which once existed between the press and prosecutor").
92. See Federal Shield Law, supra note 37, at 185.
93. Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1973), noted in Federal Shield Law, supra note 37, at 185 n.134.
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The issuance of subpoenas in Virginia is controlled by Rule 4:9
of the Rules of the Supreme Court. To obtain the documents of a
nonparty witness, the moving party must file a production for in-
spection request with the clerk of court."4 The clerk will then issue
a subpoena duces tecum which describes the things to be pro-
duced, and the time, place, and period for the production.95 The
witness is then given an opportunity to comply, or to move the
court to quash or modify the subpoena or request the moving party
to pay for the costs of production. 6 If the witness does not comply
with the subpoena, the failure to produce will constitute contempt
of court.9 7
The scope of production for discovery purposes is the same as
that for a party witness.98 Therefore, the request must concern
"any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action" and which "appears reasonably
calculated to-lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."9 9 Al-
though there is little case law interpreting the scope of Rule 4:9, it
is derived from Federal Rule 34, making federal case law persua-
sive in its application.100
2. Curbing the Use of Search Warrants: Congressional Reaction
to Search of a Newspaper Office
a. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News °1 was the first federal case to
decide whether the police can search a non-suspect using a warrant
instead of discovering needed information by use of a subpoena
duces tecum.1 0 2 The district court held that the search of the
school newspaper office in this case was illegal,103 but the Supreme
94. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:9(c) (Repl. Vol. 1987); see also W. BRYSON, supra note 13, at 271.
95. W. BRYSON, supra note 13, at 270.
96. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:9(c), :12(b) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-456 (Repl. Vol. 1982); VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:9(d) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
98. W. BRYSON, supra note 13, at 271.
99. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
100. See W. BRYSON, supra note 13, at 267. For a general discussion of discovery in Vir-
ginia, see W. BRYSON, DIscoVERY IN VIRGINIA (1978); COmMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDU-
CATION, ESSENTIALS OF DISCOVERY IN VIRGINIA, III-1 to 11I-15 (1986).
101. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
102. For a good discussion of the facts of the case and its ramifications, see Comment,
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980: Curbing Unrestricted Third-Party Searches in the
Wake of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 14 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 519 (1981).
103. 353 F. Supp. 124, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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Court reversed, stating that nothing in the fourth amendment
"suggests that a third-party search warrant should not normally
issue."'104 This decision has been widely criticized'0 5 because of the
generally recognized principle that subpoenas are less of an intru-
sion on one's privacy interests than search warrants since subpoe-
nas give more notice than a warrant and offer the subpoenaed
party a chance to quash the subpoena.0 6
b. Privacy Protection Act of 1980
As a direct result of the Zurcher holding, Congress passed the
Privacy Protection Act of 198017 to limit the issuance of search
warrants directed toward the news media. 08 Hearings by the Sub-
commitee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee
began on June 22, 1978, less than one month after the Supreme
Court decision in Zurcher. °9 The Privacy Protection Act, which
took effect on January 1, 1981, was the first federal legislative re-
sponse to the judicial treatment of the newsman's privilege. 110 It
was designed to cover both state and federal officials, as evidenced
by Congress' invocation of its authority pursuant to the interstate
commerce clause to have the law reach the actions of the states."'
Under Title I of the Act, Part A, Congress declared that "it shall
be unlawful for a government officer. . . to search for or seize any
work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed
to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication ....
104. 436 U.S. at 554.
105. Comment, supra note 102, at 524 nn.36-37; see also, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.1 (1978).
106. For an analysis of the privacy interests concerning both search warrants and sub-
poenas, see COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Legislative Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
35 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 415 (1980).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1982).
108. S. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3950.
109. Id. at 3954.
110. Comment, supra note 16, at 409.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa; see also Comment, supra note 16, at 409.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). "Work product materials," according to the Act, means,
materials, other than contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise crimi-
nally possessed, or property designed or intended for use, or which is or has been
used, as the means of committing a criminal offense, and-
(1) in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public, are prepared,
produced, authored, or created, whether by the person in possession of the materi-
als or by any other person;
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If a search warrant is requested, the person possessing the materi-
als will be given adequate opportunity to respond with evidence as
to why the material sought should not be subject to seizure. 13 Part
B of Title I also provides for civil damages if the Act is violated.
114
In addition, Title II of the Act instructs the Attorney General of
the United States to issue guidelines governing federal employees
in order to comply with the Act." 5 The guidelines have no effect
on actions of state and local officials, but state officials are still
held responsible to the original Act.
C. Newsman's Privilege in Civil Cases
The Supreme Court of Virginia has never ruled on the extent of
a privilege for newsmen in civil cases, but other jurisdictions have
sustained this type of privilege more often in civil cases than in
criminal cases." 6 One reason for this trend is that civil trials do
not involve the defendant's right to compulsory process under the
sixth amendment. 1 In addition, the interest involved is a personal
right, whereas criminal cases concern the public's interest in the
complete investigation of a crime."18
(2) are possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the public;
and
(3) include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of the person who
prepared, produced, authored, or created such material.
Id. § 2000aa-7(b).
113. Id. § 2000aa(c).
114. Id. § 2000aa-6.
115. Id. § 2000aa-11 to -12. Attorney General guidelines issued pursuant to the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980 can be found at 28 C.F.R. § 59 (1982).
The purpose of the guidelines set forth in this part is to assure that federal officers
and employees do not use search and seizure to obtain documentary materials in the
possession of disinterested third parties unless reliance on alternative means would
substantially jeopardize their availability (e.g., by creating a risk of destruction, etc.)
or usefulness (e.g., by detrimentally delaying the investigation, destroying a chain of
custody, etc.).
Id. § 59.1(b).
116. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp. 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976),
where the court stated:
In the context of a civil trial, the rationales for forcing a newsman to reveal his confi-
dences are much less weighty than those involved in criminal proceedings. For exam-
ple, in such a context, one cannot validly contend that a newsman is concealing the
criminal conduct of his source, or shielding the anonymity of criminal figures.
See also Goodale, Putan & Smeall, supra note 42, at 476-82 (how the federal circuit courts
have decided this issue); Comment, supra note 17, at 314-18; Note, supra note 45, at 1391.
117. See supra note 10.
118. Note, supra note 45, at 1391.
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There are a number of persuasive federal cases concerning civil
action that the Supreme Court of Virginia might rely upon if this
issue comes before it. These cases should be persuasive since they
interpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides a
basis for Rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia."'
1. Libel Actions
Courts often make a distinction between libel and nonlibel ac-
tions in deciding whether to compel disclosure from a journalist.
Judges are more likely to grant a motion for forced disclosure in a
libel case than in other civil actions.
Although the public person libel plaintiff may have alternative
means to show constitutional malice, the plaintiff may be precluded
from obtaining the only evidence in his or her favor if the reporter is
not compelled to identify the primary or sole source for the defama-
tory material. In particular, disclosure may be required if the re-
porter is a defendant in the libel case and can use the privilege as a
shield to protect himself or herself from liability.12
For example, the United States Supreme Court made a distinction
in libel cases when it held in Herbert v. Lando that the first
amendment privilege does not prevent a plaintiff from discovering
a reporter's editorial process in order to establish actual malice.12'
However, a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Company,'22
allowed the reporter's privilege to stand. In this case, Lyndon
LaRouche sued NBC for defamation. 2 3 LaRouche alleged that
NBC defamed him by broadcasting his statements that he believed
Jews were responsible for all the evils in the world and that he had
once proposed the assassination of President Carter and several of
Carter's aides.1 4 LaRouche filed several motions to compel discov-
ery of the sources of the information for the story, or, in the alter-
native to prevent NBC from relying at trial on the information
119. T. BOYD, E. GRAVES & L. MIDDLEDITCH, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.1 n.1 (1982).
120. METCALF, supra note 37, at 3-36 to 3-37 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1981); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
121. 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see also Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 36, at 460-63.
122. 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 79 (1986).
123. Id. at 1134, 1136.
124. Id. at 1136-37.
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from the confidential sources. The district court denied the
motions. 2 '
In affirming, the Fourth Circuit stated that a motion to compel
discovery, even when it concerns a journalist's confidential source,
"is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.' 126 The
court of appeals stated that, in deciding whether a journalist's
privilege will protect a news source, a district court must balance
the interest involved, determining: "(1) whether the information is
relevant, (2) whether the information can be obtained by alterna-
tive means, and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the
information.' 127 The court found no error in the district court's or-
der because LaRouche had not "exhausted reasonable alternative
means of obtaining this same information.'
' 2
2. Nonlibel Actions
Both state and federal judges are more likely to deny a request
for compelled disclosure of information from journalists in nonlibel
civil cases than in any other area.129 These actions have included
such diverse areas as antitrust,3 0 breach of contract,13' civil rights
and discrimination, 32 labor,'3 3 personal injury,3  and securities
cases.1
35
125. Id. at 1137.
126. Id. at 1139 (citing Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th
Cir. 1958)). The Virginia Supreme Court, relying upon federal authority, has also held that
the "granting or denying of a request under Rule 34 [now Rule 4:1, General Provisions Con-
cerning Discovery] is a matter within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only if
the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights." Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va.
542, 546, 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970) (citing Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th
Cir. 1963)).
127. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139 (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d
721, modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)).
128. Id.
129. METCALF, supra note 37, at 3-35, 3-36.
130. See, e.g., Solargen Elec. Motor Car Corp. v. American Motors Corp., 506 F. Supp.
546 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 455 F.
Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
131. See In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2127 (N.D. Iowa 1981).
132. See Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Poirier v. Carson, 537 F.2d
823 (5th Cir. 1972); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973).
133. See Maurice v. NLRB, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2221 (S.D.W. Va. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 691 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982).
134. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
135. In re Forbes Magazine, 494 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally METCALF,
supra note 37, at 3-35 to 3-38.
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In Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corporation,'38 information was
subpoenaed from a radio and television station in Richmond con-
cerning broadcasts they made about Kepone contamination in Vir-
ginia.13 7 The court, responding to a motion to quash, stated that
the first amendment "provides newsmen a privilege from revealing
their confidential news sources in civil proceedings that may be ab-
rogated only in rare and compelling circumstances.' ' 38 The court
stated further that the gain in information must be weighed
against the restricted access that newsmen would experience to in-
formational sources in the future, 3 9 and that the moving party
must show that the only practical access to the crucial information
is through the newsman's source. 40 The court granted the motion
to quash insofar as it related to the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation and news sources. However, the court denied the motion
which related to material the news agencies had collected from
nonconfidential sources and used in draft scripts and nonbroadcast
film. The court held that a reporter's slant on a story or editorial is
generally not afforded a first amendment privilege.'
4
1
In United States v. Steelhammer, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated contempt charges against reporters who re-
fused to reveal information that they personally saw at a United
Mine Workers rally. 42 However, on rehearing en banc, the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court properly required the reporters
to respond to questioning, and held them in contempt for refusing
to do so, but no further punishment of the reporters was allowed
for other reasons.
43
136. 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
137. Id. at 507.
138. Id. at 508 (citing United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); State v.
St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974)).
139. 411 F. Supp. at 510.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 511; cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
142. 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976).




A limited confidential source privilege for newsmen is now recog-
nized by most jurisdictions in this country. The courts, including
the Supreme Court of Virginia, have been reluctant to establish
this privilege at common law and are presently looking to the first
amendment of the United States Constitution for its justification.
In addition, many state legislatures have passed shield laws
which directly afford newsmen this privilege. These statutes are
designed to maintain the free flow of information to the public.
However, the protection they provide varies greatly from state to
state and Congress has never passed a federal shield law that
would create a uniform privilege. The problems involved in passing
a statute that satisfies both the media and the courts have contrib-
uted to this lack of a federal -shield law. The Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, designed to control the abuse of search warrants by
government officials against journalists' offices and complemented
by the regulations of the United States Attorney General, has
helped to fill this void. The privilege, nevertheless, is still not
clearly defined.
Virginia presently recognizes a qualified first amendment news-
man's privilege in criminal cases. However, this privilege must
yield when it conflicts with the defendant's right to due process. It
is unclear how the court would consider such a privilege in a civil
case, but, presumably, the privilege is less susceptible to attack
since the public's strong interest in deterring crime is not a factor
for the courts to consider. However, in absence of a state shield
law, newsmen in Virginia still stand a good chance of facing court
ordered disclosure of confidential sources if the party to the suit
has no other practical access to the crucial information, it is mate-
rial and relevant to the issues, and it is essential to the determina-
tion of the case.
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